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Though millions of US workers have 401(k) plans, few studies evaluate participant investment 
performance. Using data on over 1,000 401(k) plans and their participants, we identify key 
portfolio investment inefficiencies and attribute them to offered investment menus versus 
individual portfolio choices. We show that the vast majority of 401(k) plans offers reasonable 
investment menus. Nevertheless, participants “undo” the efficient menu and make substantial 
mistakes: in a 20-year career it will reduce retirement wealth by one-fifth, in fact, more than 
what a naive allocation strategy would yield. We outline implications for plan sponsors and 
participants seeking to enhance portfolio efficiency: don’t just offer or choose more funds, but 
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The Efficiency of Pension Menus 
and Individual Portfolio Choice in 401(k) Pensions 
 
Ning Tang, Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary Mottola, and Steve Utkus 
 
In the US, 401(k) plans now represent the majority of tax-deferred company-based 
retirement saving programs.  Almost 50 million active participants hold assets worth over $2 
trillion in these plans (as of 2008; Investment Company Institute, 2009), and 401(k) plans will 
increasingly represent the primary source of retirement funding for a substantial fraction of 
retirees (Poterba, Venti and Wise 2007). Accordingly, it is important to explore what options are 
commonly offered and chosen in 401(k) plans today, to help plan sponsors evaluate plan menus 
and also to assess portfolio choices made by participants. 
How individual pension portfolios perform depends on two factors: the menu designed by 
plan sponsors, and the portfolio elections made by participants. In the US, plan sponsors are 
required by the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act to offer their employees 
investment options with ‘appropriate risk and return’ features, and also to monitor these options 
to ensure that they continue to be appropriate.  Notwithstanding recent interest in plan design, 
there is little evidence on whether the menus offered are efficient. Two older studies suggested 
that some employers offer unduly restrictive investment choice sets which could depress returns 
and undermine the chances that employees can actually achieve market tangency portfolios with 
the best Sharpe ratios. For instance, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (hereafter EGB, 2006) examine 
417 smaller plans surveyed by Moody’s Investor Service in 2001;  after reviewing the menus, 
they concluded that participants in those plans would have 53 percent less terminal wealth after 
two decades, compared to having held a market portfolio. A second study focused on only a 
subset of TIAA-CREF funds offered by employer plans in the higher education sector; that 
article claimed that, over a 40-year period, a participant in these plans might forgo over half their 
final wealth compared to an expanded menu (Angus, Brown, Smith, and Smith 2007). 
Nevertheless, in recent years, plan sponsors have greatly expanded the range of choices offered 
in 401(k) investment menus, so it is essential to revisit the question of menu choice and 




Even if plan menus were designed to offer participants the range of market instruments, 
the fact remains that workers are responsible for selecting their own portfolios from the menu 
offered. Some prior studies have found that individual investors in 401(k) plans seem to follow a 
naive allocation strategy (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Agnew, 2002); exhibiting inertia in asset 
allocation (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003); showing framing 
effects (Karlsson, Massa, and Simonov, 2007); displaying low levels of financial literacy and 
investment savvy (Hancock, 2002,  Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Van Rooij, Kool and Prast, 
2007); overinvesting in company stock (Liang and Weisbenner, 2002; Huberman and 
Sengmueller, 2004); and following their peers (Duflo and Saez, 2002). Yet these studies do not 
directly address the question of whether participants are doing as well as they can, given the 
investment menus offered.  In our own previous work, we assessed the performance of 401(k) 
trading behavior (Yamaguchi, Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus 2006) using risk-adjusted returns; 
EGB (2007) also compared the Sharpe ratios and excess risk-adjusted returns of portfolios 
formed by participant investment weights, with alternative portfolios formed by a naive (1/N) 
allocation strategy. But no prior study has compared the losses that might be attributable to 
inefficient menu offerings versus those due to poor individual investment choices. This is the 
task we undertake in the present paper. 
To preview our findings, we show that the overwhelming majority of 401(k) plans 
examined do offer efficient investment menus, compared to market benchmarks. Furthermore, a 
savvy investor can do quite well in terms of mean-variance efficiency and diversification. 
Nevertheless, real-world participants fall down, since even in an efficient plan, they fail to invest 
and diversify well enough, as measured by return losses and idiosyncratic risk shares. These 
mistakes mount up, accounting for over three-quarters of the total losses sustained in an average 
portfolio. Indeed, actual investment patterns yield even worse results than what would be 
obtained using a naive allocation strategy. Finally, we show that, instead of simply adding funds 
to a plan menu, it is preferable to design a smarter menu and get participants to select the right 
set of fund choices.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. After describing the data, we turn to an 
assessment of both plan and individual portfolio efficiency. Next we investigate factors that 





I. Empirical Setting  
The information we use is collected from 401(k) plans managed by the Vanguard mutual 
fund company, on behalf of a wide range of plan sponsors; here we use information on both 
plans and individual participants. Plan-level data include both the number and type of investment 
choices offered, total assets under management, numbers of accounts,
1 plan  type,
2 and  the 
monthly total return for each fund (12/97-12/04).
3 Participant data include information on active
4 
accounts including account balances and amounts held by fund, source (employer or employee 
contributions), and participant sociodemographics (age, sex, plan tenure, non-retirement 
financial wealth, household income,
5 homeownership status, and whether the participant had web 
access
6).  Here we focus on 986,949 members of 1,003 plans as of 12/2004; each plan has at 
least 60 monthly return observations for every fund included in the menu. 
Turning first to plan menus, the distribution of funds offered appears in Figure 1. There is 
a spread in the number of funds offered (3 to 59) but most plans concentrate around the mean of 
13. Our figures are consistent with the mean of 14 reported by Brown, Liang and Weisbenner 
(using 2002 data; 2007);
7 in 2004, the Profit-sharing/401(k) Council of America found that the 
average number of funds was around 17-18.
8 For this reason, we believe that our sample is 
reasonably representative of the environment. Table 1 indicates the percentage of plans offering 
different types of funds. Overall, plan offerings are well diversified 99 percent offer fixed 
income/ money market funds, 97 percent have bond funds, 97 percent have balanced funds, and 
almost all offer equity funds. It is also worth noting the high percentage of plans offering 
international funds (93 percent) and low percentage of plans offering company stock options (11 
percent).  
Figure 1 and Table 1 here 
Summary statistics on the plan characteristics appear in Table 2. Plan assets average $73 
million, with an average of 1,222 participants per plan. Domestic equity funds dominate the 
menus, with an average share of 19 percent in index funds and up to 28 percent in actively 
managed (AM) funds; also funds include (in decreasing order): AM balanced funds, money 
market funds, AM international equity funds, index bond funds, AM bond funds, index   
international equity funds, index balanced funds and other funds.  




Prior research has suggested that, as plans added funds over the years, the fraction of 
equity options has grown and most of the newly-added funds have been actively-managed 
(Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner 2007). This could potentially be costly to participants if the 
index funds were less expensive and outperformed high-cost actively managed funds. In Figure 2 
we array the funds in our sample according to the number of menu options.  It is clear that, as the 
total number of funds rises, domestic equity funds do indeed become more prevalent.  In addition, 
actively managed funds are more prevalent than index funds, when more choices are offered; and 
domestic equity dominates in both AM funds and index funds. 
Figure 2 here 
Table 3 provides an overview of plan participant features as well as their individual 
portfolios.
9  Panel A reports demographic characteristics, where we see that the mean participant 
is 45 years old; two-thirds are male; and annual household incomes average about $86,000. Non-
retirement wealth amounts to about $42,000; most participants (96 percent) own a home; and 
almost half (45 percent) of them have web access. Panel B summarizes participant portfolios and 
indicates that the mean 401(k) plan balance is $63,000, a balance comparable to the Investment 
Company Institute’s (2008) data where the average age was 44 years old and the mean account 
balance about $65,000. On average, participants select 3.7 funds per person and have 88 percent 
of their balances invested in risky assets (with the remainder mostly in index funds).
10 
Table 3 here  
Individual fund choices appear in Figure 3. There is a notable correlation between the 
fund options offered and selected. This may be due to the “naive allocation” patterns 
documented by Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and Agnew (2002), who argued that people simply 
divide their money equally across all investment choices (1/N). Alternatively, plan sponsors may 
be offering the investment options that participants demand. There is also some evidence of 
overinvestment in company stock: that is, there is a much higher share of company stock chosen 
than offered. It is also worth noting that domestic equity funds and AM balanced funds dominate 
individual portfolios. Lastly, participants are more likely to choose actively managed instead of 
index funds except in the case of bonds. This may be partly due to the recent growth of actively 
managed balanced funds.  




Overall, these findings are comparable to larger fund universe. Thus equity funds here 
account for 53 percent of the assets; bond funds 8 percent; company stock 9 percent; money and 
GIC funds 12 percent; and non-lifecycle balanced funds 3 percent. By comparison, the 
Investment Company Institute (2008) showed that in 2004, participant assets were invested 
similarly, with fund allocations to equity at 46 percent, bonds 10 percent, company stock 15 
percent, money and GIC funds 16 percent, and balanced funds 8 percent.   
 
II. Testing for Menu Efficiency 
In this section we test for plan menu efficiency by comparing available menus to market 
benchmarks, using the intersection test developed by DeRoon, Nijman and Werker (2001). This 
test classifies plans as either efficient or not, but does not indicate how far from efficient any 
given plan might be. Accordingly, we also use two additional performance measures classify 
plan menus: these are the plan-specific relative Sharpe ratio loss, and the idiosyncratic risk share 
(used by Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, 2006 to investigate the efficiency of Swedish households’ 
investment decisions).  
Efficiency Test. To test whether the investment choices offered in DC plans are efficient, we 
must ascertain whether one could improve the performance of the tangency portfolio (optimal 
linear combination) of funds held by a plan, by adding additional investment options excluded 
from the plan’s menu. This requires constructing a set of investment choices sufficient to capture 
the return-risk characteristics of market investment opportunities.  As in EGB (2006), we 
construct a “market benchmark” composed of eight commonly-accepted financial market 
indexes: four are domestic equity indexes following the Fama-French classification (Russell 
1000 growth, Russell 1000 value, Russell 2000 growth, and Russell 2000 value);
11 the  two 
domestic bond indexes are the Lehman Aggregate and Credit Suisse First Boston High Yield.
12 
We also use one international equity index MSCI EAFE and one international bond index JP 
Morgan Global Government Bond Non-US$. Finally, the one-month T-bill is taken as risk-free 
interest rate.
13   
We evaluate whether adding any of the eight market benchmark indexes to each plan’s 
tangency portfolio of funds would significantly improve the portfolio return at a given level of 
risk. Under this test, there are short sale constraints for both funds in a plan and market 




  t i t i i t i R r , ,           (1)      
where  t i r , is the excess return of the ith benchmark index (i=1,2…8),  t R  refers to excess returns 
of subset of funds held by a plan where short-sale constraints are not binding,
14 and  i  is the 
Jensen’s alpha from regression on ith benchmark index. We also test whether  i i   0    for each 
plan. As short-sales are not allowed for market benchmark index, if none of the  i   are 
statistically significant positive, we could conclude that performance of funds under the plan t R  
cannot be improved by holding a long position in any of the eight market benchmark indexes. 
The specific test statistic is: 
) ˆ ( ] ˆ [ )' ˆ ( min
1
} 0 {      
   

 Var       (2) 
where   ˆ  is an 8*1 vector of estimated Jensen’s alphas. For the critical value used in the test, we 
adopt the lower/upper bounds suggested by Kodde and Palm (1986) and run 1000 simulations to 
see if the test statistic falls within the critical value bounds. 
Our results indicate that 94 percent, or 940 of the 1,003 plans studied, are efficient 
compared to market benchmarks, by the efficiency criterion described above. This implies that 
401(k) plan participants can do as well as if they were investing in the capital market at large, by 
choosing an optimal portfolio in their efficient 401(k) plans. It is important to point out that even 
plans with few choices on the menu can still be as efficient as the benchmark. Inasmuch as 
mutual funds can span a combination of two or more market benchmark indexes, even few 
investment offerings can serve participants well – as long as the choices offered are sensible ones. 
We explore this point further in next section. 
Our finding of virtual complete 401(k) plan menu efficiency differs from the less positive 
finding in EGB’s (2006) older study. Several factors may account for this difference. First, the 
EGB sample plans are far less diversified than are ours: for instance, only 71 percent plans in the 
EGB sample offered domestic bond funds, 81 percent plans had domestic mix (balanced) funds, 
75 percent plans had international funds, and 87 percent had interest-only (money market) funds. 
Our set of plans is much more diverse, as indicated in Table 1. Second, our plans are far likely to 
offer bond funds (71 percent in EGB vs. 97 percent in our sample), which also enhances plan 




were drawn from 2001. The recent rapid growth in the mutual fund market may explain their 
better menus today.  
Relative Sharpe Ratio Loss. We also compute the relative Sharpe ratio loss (RSRL) which 
compares the Sharpe ratio of a given portfolio with that of a benchmark portfolio. This measures 
the extent of economic loss from holding an inefficient portfolio in the mean-variance 
framework (Calvet, Campbell and Sodini 2006).  In our case, the portfolio to be measured is the 
tangency portfolio of funds under each plan. The benchmark portfolio is the tangency portfolio 
formed by the eight market benchmark indexes introduced in earlier. Thus for portfolio p, the 













 is the Sharpe ratio 
of tangency portfolio of funds held under the plan;
 15 the moments of the plan are estimated by 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM; see the Appendix for details); and  B S is the Sharpe ratio 
of tangency portfolio of eight benchmark indexes used in the efficiency test. The moments of the 
eight indexes are also estimated using CAPM. From equation (3), we can see that the lower the 
ratio, the closer are the two Sharpe ratios; in other words, this implies a better plan performance 
relative to the benchmark portfolio. 
The first row of Table 4 provides the distribution of relative Sharpe ratio losses of the 
tangency portfolio formed by available funds in each plan. Overall, the 401(k) plans in our 
analysis sample perform very well compared to the benchmark portfolio: the mean relative 
Sharpe ratio loss of 0.03 is quite low. In other words, the Sharpe ratio of the tangency portfolio 
of an average plan is 97 percent of that of the benchmark portfolio. Furthermore, the sample 
plans vary little in terms of their relative Sharpe ratio losses: even at the 90th percentile, the 
measure is only 0.05. A small residual of plans does not perform very well, which boosts the 99
th 
percentile of the measure to 0.66. 
 Table 4 here   
Idiosyncratic Risk Share. Next we examine idiosyncratic risk share measures, or the share of 
portfolio total variance attributable to idiosyncratic risk out. Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the 
risk that can be diversified away; therefore it measures a portfolio’s undiversified risk (Calvet, 












risk of tangency portfolio of funds held by the plan, and  p
^
  is the total risk of the tangency 
portfolio. So the lower the ratio, the better is the performance of a given plan. 
        The distribution of idiosyncratic risk share across our sample is displayed in the 
second row of Table 4. On average, the idiosyncratic risk is 0.03; in other words, only 3 percent 
of the total variance of plan’s tangency portfolio is not diversified away. Even at the 90
th 
percentile, the ratio is still below 0.08, which indicates a high diversification level. It is 
interesting that a handful, around 1 percent of the plans, does not perform well according to this 
measure, having an idiosyncratic risk share of over 0.21. 
We can also compare performance measures for efficient and inefficient plans. Here 
results show that there is little difference in the two performance measures between efficient and 
inefficient plans (relative Sharpe ratio losses are 0.04 vs. 0.03, and idiosyncratic risk shares are 
0.05 vs. 0.03 for inefficient and efficient plans respectively).  This suggests that even inefficient 
plans in our sample are not far from offering efficient menu selections. In sum, we conclude that 
the plan menus offered in this sample are quite efficient in terms of mean-variance efficiency and 
diversification level. Even the few inefficient plans are not performing terribly, and there is little 
evidence of plan menu design inefficiency. 
 
III. Testing for Individual Investment Efficiency  
Next we assess the efficiency of individual participants’ investment efficiency given the 
plan menus offered. Three measures are used. The first is the total return loss, which captures 
the investor’s return shortfall from what he could have optimally obtained from the capital 
market, given his preferred level of investment risk.  It is an overall evaluation on total losses of 
participants’ portfolio caused by both participant investment choice inefficiency and plan menu 
inefficiency. The second measure is the relative return loss, which captures the investor’s return 
shortfall from what he could have optimally obtained from the plan offered, instead of the capital 
market in total return loss measure.  Such a measure excludes any inefficiency resulting from 
menu restrictions, thus successfully distinguishing participant investment mistakes from the 
inefficiency due to menu design. The third measure is the idiosyncratic risk share. As 
documented by Poterba, Venti and Wise (2007) and EGB (2006), retirement accounts are the 




actual portfolios selected exhibit proper diversification is important in evaluating portfolio 
performance.  
Total Return Loss.  The concept of “return loss” speaks to the return shortfall experienced by a 
participant’s actual portfolio, given his choice of risk level, compared to the highest return that 
he could have been achieved in the broader capital market (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2006). 
Assume that a participant in plan  j  chooses a portfolio  p  with risk level p  . The monthly total 
return loss for his portfolio is:  ) ( p B p p w RL     (6), where  B   is the best return that could be 
optimally attained at risk level p  , with the eight market benchmark indexes which represent the 
capital market investment opportunities mentioned earlier; and  p   is the actual return of the 
participant’s portfolio for the same risk level p  . The term p w  refers to the risk share, which is 
calculated using the balance amount in each individual participant’s portfolio. This weight 
multiplier permits the measure to reflect the fact that participants holding poorly performing 
risky assets might still be close to the efficient frontier if they their risky exposure is small. The 
total return loss before weight adjustment is demonstrated by the line segment A in Figure 4, 
where ( p  , p  ) is the actual portfolio chosen by the participant, and the outer curve is the 
efficient frontier formed by the eight market benchmark indexes.  
Figure 4 here 
The first panel in Figure 5 shows the distribution of the monthly total return loss for 
986,949 individual portfolios in 1,003 plans (as of 12/04).  The mean total return loss is a 
monthly 0.1093 percent; again there is a distribution around this mean, with 3 percent of the 
participants having a return loss of zero and 1 percent of participants having a total return loss of 
over 0.4 percent per month.  To put these results into context, if assume a participant could earn 
a monthly return of 0.5 percent,
16 he could be expected to enhance his retirement wealth by 30 
percent over a 20-year holding period by moving to the efficient frontier.
17 Additionally, under 
the same assumption, those in the largest one percentile of the return loss distribution could lose 
up to 160 percent in retirement wealth over a 20-year period.
18 Accordingly, plan participants 
forgo a substantial component of retirement accruals by not investing optimally. 




Relative Return Loss.   The total return loss above measures the total loss due to both participant 
investment choice inefficiency and plan menu restrictions. To distinguish between these sources 
of inefficiency, we next calculate the relative return loss which reflects only the inefficiency 
resulting from poor participant investment choices given plan menus. We do so by computing 
the best return obtainable in plan j for risk level  p  or is B  in equation (5), keeping all other 
factors constant. That is, we calculate the return shortfall of each actual individual portfolio 
compared to the best return that could be obtained in the same plan for the same risk level. Thus 
line segment B in Figure 4 reflects the relative return loss before weight adjustment  p w in 
equation (6), where the interior curve is the efficient frontier formed by funds available in a plan. 
The distance between segments A and B measures the inefficiency caused by menu restrictions. 
The second graph in Figure 5 reports the distribution of monthly relative return losses for 
the same participants; here we see that these losses are concentrated around a monthly mean loss 
of 0.079 percent. This monthly relative return loss would imply 21 percent less retirement wealth 
after a 20-year period. Again there is a distribution: some 6 percent of the participants have a 
return loss of zero, but 1 percent of participants experience a return loss of over 0.29 percent per 
month.  Thus we conclude that few plan participants actually select an optimal portfolio from the 
menu offered to them, and a subset will lose a great deal, having failed to make wise investment 
choices. On average, the relative return loss from participant investment mistakes accounts for 
three quarters (76 percent) of the total return loss, indicating that participant portfolio choice 
inefficiency is the main source of underperformance.  
Idiosyncratic Risk Share. Next we turn examine the idiosyncratic risk share of an individual’s 
portfolio, defined as the ratio of idiosyncratic risk to the portfolio’s total variance. Figure 6 
displays the distribution of this measure, and it shows that the mean value of the idiosyncratic 
risk share is 0.187, a value much higher than the level that could be optimally achieved in a plan 
(it has a mean of 0.03 as shown in Table 4). Again there is a wide range from 0.001 to 0.997; 
also the top 5 percent of participants has an idiosyncratic risk share of more than 0.77, meaning 
that 77 percent of the portfolio variance is not rewarded by higher expected return.  In other 
words, the idiosyncratic risk share evidence indicates that participants do not satisfactorily 
diversify their 401(k) plan portfolios. 




Actual Portfolio vs. Naive Allocation Strategy. Because of this opportunity to evaluate actual 
participant portfolios, we can also determine whether participants do better than simply 
following a naive allocation strategy such as the simple “1/N” approach described above, which 
equally weights all funds offered (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Agnew, 2002). To do so, we 
evaluate the relative return loss and idiosyncratic risk share of a hypothetical participant in each 
plan who follows a naive allocation strategy and compare it to the actuals just described. Results 
appear in Figure 7, which confirm that actual individual portfolios underperform even the naive 
allocation strategy: they have higher relative return losses (0.079 percent vs.0.076 percent) and 
much higher idiosyncratic risk shares (0.187 vs. 0.04). This reinforces our conclusion that 
participants do not invest as efficiently as they could in their 401(k) plans. 
Figure 7 here 
 
IV. Determinants of Portfolio Efficiency: Behavioral and Plan Menu Effects 
Having detected substantial inefficiencies in individual portfolio choice patterns, it is of 
use to inquire how investment performance might be enhanced. Two clear paths are available to 
improve 401(k) individual portfolio performance: by getting individual participants to alter their 
portfolio choices, or by altering plan sponsor menus. Specifically, we examine factors 
contributing to the variation in portfolio performance across participants and plans, and we 
further explore what characteristics contribute to plan menu efficiency.  In particular, we seek to 
learn whether simply adding more funds, as most plan sponsors are doing today, is likely to 
boost plan efficiency.  
Individual Portfolio Choice Effects. Given the wide range of menu options available to 401(k) 
investors, it is useful to check what kinds of funds are most likely to boost participant outcomes. 
Prior studies have shown that actively managed funds underperform index funds (Brown, Liang 
and Weisbenner, 2007), but that work did not evaluate actual participant portfolio performance. 
We fill this gap by investigating whether there are significant differences between index versus 
actively managed funds, using the following multivariate regression function:  
j i j j i j i j i Plan Demo Invest Perform , 3 , 2 , 1 ,            (7),   
where i refers to the individual participant, and j refers to the plan. Dependent variables 




calculated previously.  j i Invest ,   refers to a vector of individual investment characteristics 
including the number of funds chosen, company stock share and shares of eight types of funds: 
index bond, actively managed bond, index balanced, actively managed balanced, index domestic 
equity, actively managed domestic equity, index international equity, and actively managed 
international equity. j i Demo ,   refers to individual demographic characteristics such as the 
participant’s age, income, non-retirement wealth, and web access.  j Plan  refers to a vector of 
plan-specific characteristics which affect  j i Perform ,  and are common among all participants in 
the same plan. 
To eliminate unobserved plan fixed effects, j Plan , we transformation the data as follows:  











j Demo and 
_______
j Invest are the plan level mean of j i Perform , ,  j i Invest ,  and  
j i Demo , respectively. Table 5 shows results of estimating equation (7); dependent variables in the 
two columns are, respectively, relative return losses in percentage, and idiosyncratic risk share. 
The results show that choosing more funds does not much curtail return losses, although it can 
improve portfolio diversification. Inasmuch as most 401(k) assets are mutual funds (funds of 
assets), it is possible that a single mutual fund could span the portfolio formed by several 
individual assets. For this reason, participants should not strive to diversity across all funds in the 
portfolio for its own sake. Second, all the funds, except for international equity actively managed 
and balanced equity index funds, outperform the domestic equity index funds in terms of return 
losses. Bond funds help to improve the performance most. This means that in addition to holding 
domestic equity funds like most participants do today, holding bond funds, also make sense. 
Third, index domestic funds improve portfolio diversification level most, so they are good 
choices in terms of portfolio diversification. Fourth, index funds do not dominate actively 
managed funds in every respect: although index funds help improve portfolio diversification 
more than do actively managed funds (except international equity funds), they do not persistently 
outperform actively managed funds in terms of return loss. 




 Finally, we find that younger and more financially sophisticated with web access or 
higher income participants or those with more non-retirement wealth have lower return losses.  
In addition, the younger people and people with more non-retirement wealth, but less income and 
no web access, have more diversified portfolios.  These results are consistent with Calvet, 
Campbell and Sodini (2006) who show that richer people choose more diversified portfolios 
while older people do not, but we differ in that Sweden that richer and more educated Swedish 
households bear higher costs from portfolio inefficiency as measured by return loss. This might 
be due to differences in financial literacy between Swedish and US 401(k) households. 
In sum, we conclude that participants do try to diversify their portfolios, but this does not 
insure they end up with an efficient portfolio mix inside their 401(k) plans.  
Menu Effects. To determine what menu design factors might influence plan efficiency, next we 
run regressions of the form: 
          j i j j j PRTCHAR PLANCHAR PLANCOMP Perform , 3 2 1  (9), 
where the dependent variable  j Perform   is a vector of outcomes indicating performance 
measures for the plans described earlier. A first dependent variable is a (0,1) indicator which 
takes on the value of 1 if the plan is efficient (0 if not); we also examine patterns for the relative 
Sharpe ratio loss and idiosyncratic risk share, respectively. The explanatory variable 
PLANCOMP represents a vector of plan characteristics including the number of options offered 
and the availability of different types of funds.
19  A second vector of explanatory variables 
PLANCHAR is used to control for plan characteristics such as plan size (measured by ln 
accounts, ln 401(k) plan assets,
20 and contribution source). We also control on PRTCHAR which 
captures participant characteristics such as age, sex, plan tenure, and income as well as asset 
indicators – some of which are correlated with financial sophistication (ln non-retirement 
financial wealth, ln household income, home ownership, and web access).  
Table 6 shows the results of these multivariate models, where the first is a Probit 
regression on plan efficiency, and the other two are OLS regressions on the relative Sharpe ratio 
loss and idiosyncratic risk share. The evidence suggests that simply having more funds on the 
menu does not improve plan efficiency, although it can curtail the relative Sharpe ratio loss and 
idiosyncratic risk share. The magnitudes are small compared to the effect of other factors such as 




coefficient of -0.004, the magnitude of which is much lower than the coefficient on availability 
of index and actively managed bond funds (-0.13 and -0.05). The marginal benefit from adding 
more options is also decreasing, as indicated by the concave relationship between the number of 
options and plan performance.  This is a striking finding, especially considering the current trend 
of plan sponsors to expand plan menus seeking to better serve participants. Since a single mutual 
fund contains different assets, having even a handful of these in the menu can achieve substantial 
diversification. Accordingly, plan sponsors should not merely load more funds onto the menu in 
the hopes of increasing plan efficiency.  
The conclusion is further confirmed by Figure 8.
21 It shows the average relative Sharpe 
ratio loss and idiosyncratic risk share calculated earlier, for plans arrayed by the number of funds 
they offer in their menus. Overall, the two measures are very low, indicating good plan 
performance. When a plan has more than nine funds, the measure becomes quite stable. Thus 
adding more funds does not improve the relative Sharpe ratio loss or idiosyncratic risk share 
much after this point.   
Table 6 and Figure 8 here 
In Table 6, we also find that specific kinds of funds have the largest positive effect in 
improving menu efficiency. Including index bond funds, for instance, is beneficial for efficiency; 
conversely, balanced and actively managed international equity funds hurt plan efficiency during 
this period. Last, we find that adding index domestic equity funds also improves plan efficiency, 
not the case for actively managed domestic equity funds.  
Considering the economic cost of adding more funds and the potential loss participants 
might bear from facing complicated menus, it may be better for plan sponsors to devote attention 
to fund selection, to enhance influence plan performance. Previously we noted that plan sponsors 
have increased the number of actively managed domestic equity funds over time, but our 
evidence suggests that this should not be done in the name of plan efficiency. And it is better to 
add funds that make the menu more efficient, rather than simply making the menu longer. 
 
V. Conclusions and Implications  
We have used a rich new dataset to explore what options are commonly offered and 
elected in modern US 401(k) plans, with the goal of evaluating investment menus offered by 




determinants of portfolio efficiency and to outline what can be done to enhance it. On the 
positive side, virtually all the plans we examine are efficient compared to the benchmark; this 
means that the plan sponsors can be applauded for offering sensible menus in terms of mean-
variance efficiency and diversification. On the negative side, we find that participants err by 
investing inefficiently and not diversifying enough. Such mistakes can be important, producing 
one-fifth less retirement wealth in a 20-year period. Participants’ failure to pick the best portfolio 
from the investment options offered to them account for the bulk of their poor performance. 
Therefore this offers room for better-designed default options which employees might be moved 
into in an autoenrollment framework (Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi, 2009).   
Although we focus here mainly on behavior in individual retirement accounts, our 
research has implications for portfolio choice and wealth outcomes more generally. Today 
almost half of all Americans have at least some assets in a tax-deferred account, and asset 
allocations are quite similar inside and outside tax-deferred accounts (Bergstresser and Poterba 
2004). Consequently it is likely that the inefficiencies observed in the retirement context are 
replicated outside the 401(k) setting. To combat participants’ financial illiteracy, it may therefore 
be critical to provide financial education and advice regarding investment patterns. This 
philosophy informed the adoption of so-called ‘default’ investment options such as target 
maturity date funds under the 2006 Pension Protection Act.  Better managed retirement saving 





Agnew, Julie, Pierluigi Balduzzi, and Annika Sunden. 2003. “Portfolio Choice and Trading in a 
Large 401(K) Plan.” American Economic Review 93 (1), 193-215. 
Agnew, Julie. 2002. “Inefficient Choices in 401(K) Plans: Evidence from Individual Level Data.” 
Presented at the 4
th Annual Joint Conference for the Retirement Research Consortium 
“Directions for Social Security Reform,” May 2002, Washington, D.C. 
Ameriks, John, and Stephen P. Zeldes. 2004. “How do Household Portfolio Shares Vary with 
Age?”  TIAA-CREF working paper.  
Angus, John, William O. Brown, Janet Kiholm Smith, and Richard L. Smith. 2007. “What's in 
Your 403(B)? Academic Retirement Plans and the Costs of Underdiversification.” 
Financial Management, Summer 2007, 1-38. 
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard H. Thaler. 2001. “Naïve Diversification Strategies in Defined 
Contribution Savings Plans.”  American Economic Review, 91 (1), 79-98. 
Bergstresser, Daniel, and James Poterba. 2004. “Asset Allocation and Asset Location: 
Household Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances.” Journal of Public 
Economics, 88 (9-10), 1893-1915. 
Blake, Christopher R., Edwin J. Elton, and Martin J. Gruber. 1993. “The Performance of Bond 
Mutual Funds.”  Journal of Business, 66, 371-403. 
Brown, Jeffrey R., Nellie Liang, and Scott Weisbenner. 2007. “Individual Account Investment 
Options and Portfolio Choice: Behavioral Lessons from 401(K) Plans.”  Journal of 
Public Economics, 91 (10), 1992 – 2013.  
Calvet, Laurent E., John Y. Campbell, and Paolo Sodini. 2006. “Down or Out: Assessing the 
Welfare Costs of Household Investment Mistakes.” Journal of Political Economy, 115 
(5), 707-747. 
DeRoon, Frans A., Theo E. Nijman, and Bas J.M. Werker. 2001. “Testing for Mean-Variance 
Spanning with Short Sales Constraints and Transaction Costs: The Case of Emerging 
Markets.”  Journal of Finance, 56 (2), 721-742. 
Duflo, Esther, and Emmanuel Saez. 2002. “Participation and Investment Decisions in a 
Retirement Plan: The Influence of Colleagues’ Choices.” Journal of Public Economics, 




Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber, and Christopher R. Blake. 2006. “The Adequacy of 
Investment Choices Offered by 401K Plans.” Journal of Public Economics, 90 (6-7), 
1299-1314. 
Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber, and Christopher R. Blake. 2007. “Participant Reaction and the 
Performance of Funds Offered by 401(K) Plans.” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16 
(2), 240-271. 
Hancock, John. 2002. “Eighth Defined Contribution Plan Survey.”  John Hancock Financial 
Services, Boston: John Hancock. 
Huberman, Gur, and Paul Sengmueller. 2004. “Performance and Employer Stock in 401(K) 
Plans.” Review of Finance, 8, 403-443.  
Investment Company Institute. 2008. “401(K) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and 
Loan Activity in 2007.”  Investment Company Institute Research Perspective, 14 (3), 
2008. 
Investment Company Institute. 2009. “The U.S. Retirement Market, 2008.” Investment Company 
Institute Research Fundamentals, 18(5), June 2009. 
Karlsson, Anders, Massimo Massa, and Andrei Simonov. 2007. “Pension Portfolio Choice and 
Menu Exposure.” In: Madrian, Brigitte, Olivia S. Mitchell, Beth J. Soldo (eds.), 
Redefining Retirement: How Will Boomers Fare? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 248-
270. 
Kodde, David A., and Franz C. Palm. 1986. “Wald Criteria for Jointly Testing Equality and 
Inequality Restrictions.” Econometrica, 54, 1243-1248. 
Liang, Nellie, and Scott Weisbenner. 2002. “Investor Behavior and the Purchase of Company 
Stock in 401(K) Plans - The Importance of Plan Design.” Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series 2002-36. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2002. 
Lusardi, Annamaria and Olivia S. Mitchell. 2007.  “Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The 
Roles of Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics. 54(1) January: 205-224. 
Mitchell, Olivia S., Gary Mottola, Steve Utkus, and Takeshi Yamaguchi. 2009. “Menu Effects 
and Retirement Saving: The Impact of Life Cycle Funds on 401(K) Plan Portfolios.”  




Poterba, James, Steven Venti, and David Wise. 2007. “Rise of 401(K) Plans, Lifetime Earnings, 
and Wealth at Retirement.” NBER Working Paper No. 13091. 
Van Rooij, Maarthen C.J., Clements, J.M. Kool, and Henriette M. Prast. 2007. “Risk-Return 
Preferences in the Pension Domain: Are People Able to Choose?” Journal of Public 
Economics, 91 (3-4), 701-722. 
Yamaguchi, Takeshi, Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola, and Stephen P. Utkus. 2006. “Winners 
and Losers: 401(K) Trading and Portfolio Performance.” Pension Research Council 





Table 1. Percentage of Plans Offering Investment Options by Fund Type  
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
Note: Brokerage option permits employees to choose their own stock options; 1,003 plans. 
 























Table 2. Summary Statistics on Plan Menus  
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
Note:  1,003 plans 
 
 
Total assets ($M) 73.44 2.62 5.38 15.58 46.77 155.05
Number of participants 1222 37 80 246 866 2562
Total number of options per plan 13.48 100 8 10 13 16 19
   Money market 1.29 11 1 1 1 2 2
   Bond index 0.88 7 0 1 1 1 1
   Bond actively managed 0.77 5 0 0 0 1 2
   Balanced index 0.13 1 0 0 0 0 1
   Balanced actively managed 2.65 19 1 1 2 4 5
   Domestic equity index 2.46 19 1 1 2 3 4
   Domestic equity actively managed 3.83 28 2 2 3 5 7
   International equity index 0.32 2 0 0 0 0 1
   International equity actively managed  1.00 8 0 1 1 1 2















Table 3. Summary Statistics on Participants.  
 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Note: 986,614 participants. 
 
 
Table 4.  Distribution of Plan Performance Measures 
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
Note: N=1,003 plans. 
Demographic characteristics
Age 45 30 37 45 52 58
Male (yes=1, no=0) 0.68 0 0 1 1 1
Household income ($) 86,227 35,000 62,500 86,319 87,500 137,500
Non-retirement wealth ($) 41,708 0 1,677 7,280 35,737 111,683
Web access (yes=1, no=0) 0.45 0 0 0 1 1
Homeowner (yes=1, no=0) 0.96 1 1 1 1 1
Individual portfolio characteristics
Number of funds chosen 3.72 1 2 3 5 7
Total balance ($K) 63.27 2.28 8.99 28.19 74.02 158.31
Index share 0.28 0 0 0.21 0.47 0.76










Relative Sharpe ratio loss 0.03 0.003 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.66


















Table 5.  Regression of Return Loss and Idiosyncratic Risk Share on Individual 
Characteristics and Plan Features 
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 




Number of funds chosen  3.72 0.0005% *** -1.26% ***
Balanced index funds share (in %) 0.52% -0.000001% 0.02% ***
Balanced actively managed funds share (in %) 17.77% -0.0002% *** 0.16% ***
Bond index funds share (in %) 5.16% -0.0008% *** 0.11% ***
Bond actively managed funds share (in %) 2.63% -0.0008% *** 0.17% ***
Domestic equity actively managed  funds share (in %) 26.61% -0.00004% *** 0.17% ***
International equity index funds share (in %) 0.49% -0.0003% *** 0.12% ***
International equity actively managed funds share (in %) 3.37% 0.0002% *** 0.05% ***
Company stock Share (in %) 9.31% -0.0002% *** 0.88% ***
(Ref: Domestic equity index funds share)
Participant characteristics
Age 44.56 0.0001% *** 0.01% ***
Web access (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.45 -0.0018% *** 0.15% ***
Ln household income ($) 11.18 -0.0001% * 0.07% ***
Ln non-retirement financial wealth ($) 8.06 -0.0001% *** -0.04% ***
R squared 0.2885 0.6058
Coefficient Coefficient
(1) Relative return loss 
(in %)






Table 6.  Menu Effects on Plan Efficiency and Performance  
 
Source: Authors’ computations.  
Note: 1,003 plans.  
Dependent variables Mean
Plan components
Number of funds  12 -0.18% -0.004 *** -0.003 ***
Number of funds square 177 0.002% 0.0001 *** 0.0001 ***
Offer balanced index funds (yes=1, no=0) 0.13 -3.68% * 0.004 -0.001
        Balanced actively managed funds 0.93 0.89% 0.01 0.01 **
        Bond index funds 0.81 8.00% *** -0.13 *** -0.08 ***
        Bond actively managed funds 0.46 0.22% -0.05 *** -0.01 **
        Domestic equity index funds 0.99 16.89% ** 0.01 0.01
        Domestic equity actively managed funds 0.97 -2.30% 0.00 0.01
        International equity index funds 0.24 0.69% 0.02 ** 0.01
        International equity actively managed funds 0.84 -1.88% 0.005 0.01 **
        Company stock 0.11 -2.77% 0.02 0.01 *
R squared 0.0426 0.3035 0.4769
OLS coefficient Marginal effect














Figure 1. Percentage of Plans Offering Various Numbers of Funds 
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 


























Figure 2. Number of Index/ Actively Managed Funds vs. Total Number of Funds  
A. Number of Index Funds by Type vs. Number of Funds Offered 
 
B. Number of Actively Managed (AM) Funds by Type vs. Number of Funds Offered 
 
Source: Authors’ computation. 



































































Figure 3.  Allocation of Individual Participants’ Portfolios. 
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
Note:  1,003 plans and 986,614 participants. 
 
 
Figure 4. Total and Relative Return Loss 
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Figure 5. Individual Portfolio Total Return Loss and Relative Return Loss Distribution.  
 
Total Return Loss 
 
 
B.   Relative Return Loss 
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 









































Figure 6.  Individual Portfolio Idiosyncratic Risk Share Distribution  
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
































































































Figure 7.  Actual Portfolio Performance vs. Naive Allocation Performance  
 
A.   Monthly Relative Return Loss 
 
 
B.  Idiosyncratic Risk Share 
 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Figure 8.  Performance Measures vs. Number of Funds  
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
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Appendix: Estimating Return Moments 
To compute each plan’s performance measures, we must estimate each plan-specific 
mean and variance of returns. We adopt the CAPM asset pricing model and following Calvet, 
Campbell, and Sodini (2006) , we regress fund returns on three market indexes:                                                     
t i t i t i t i it EAFE BOND MKT R ,
3 2 1         ,  
where  t i R , is the excess return for fund i; MKT is the excess return for Russell 3000 (broad 
domestic equity market); BOND is the excess return for Lehman US aggregate (broad domestic 
bond market); EAFE is the excess return for MSCI EAFE (international equity market); and the 
time period is 12/97~12/04 (or less if not available for some funds).  Using the estimated risk 
loading 
3 2 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
i i i    from the regression above, we can estimate moments for each fund: 
idio f f       ˆ ' ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ       , where  f  ˆ  is the vector of estimated mean excess return over all 
funds;  f  ˆ is the estimated variance-covariance matrix of excess returns over all funds;  ˆ
 is the 
vector of three betas over all funds ) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ , )' ˆ ,..., ˆ ( ˆ 3 2 1
1 i i i i i b b b       ; ˆ is the mean excess return 
over three benchmark funds,  )' ˆ , ˆ ˆ ( ˆ , EAFE BOND MKT       ;  ˆ  is the variance-covariance matrix of 
three benchmark funds; and  idio  ˆ is the estimated idiosyncratic risk of funds estimated from the 
variance-covariance matrix of regression residuals  t i,  . 
Now, based on the estimated mean and variance of returns over all funds, we estimate 
moments of plans:        idio p idio f p f p        ˆ ' ˆ , ˆ ' ˆ , ˆ ' ˆ , , where   is the weight vector over 





                                                 
1 Each employee in a plan is assigned a unique account. 
2 Most of the plans are 401(k) plans in private for profit firms; there are also a few 403(b) plans 
for the non-profit sector. 
3 In a handful of cases, some funds have fewer than 85 months of return observations. 
4 Active accounts have positive contributions over the 24-month window (for 2003-04). 
5 Data from IXI Corporation are used to impute non-retirement household financial wealth and 
household income is imputed by Claritas for 2003 using participant ZIP codes. 
6 Those who have elected to obtain plan information via the internet are defined as having web 
access.  
7 Their sample includes firms filing 11-Ks in 1998 and they follow them through 2002.  
8 These figures are larger than the eight in EGB’s (2006) older data on 401(k) plans surveyed in 
2001 by Moody’s Investor Service.   
9 Table 3 is computed for 986,614 participants; we lose a few participants because of missing 
demographic data. The efficiency measure used requires some nonzero risk exposure.  
10 All shares shown in Table 3 are calculated from balances.  
11  Russell 1000 growth, Russell 1000 value, Russell 2000 growth and Russell 2000 value 
respectively represent large-cap growth, large-cap value, small-cap growth and small-cap value 
US equity markets. 
12  Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993) suggest including a high-yield bond index to capture 
differences in return across bond funds. 
13  Since only risky funds are the focus of the efficiency test (equity, balanced, bond, and 
company stock funds), we delete money market funds, investment contract s, and unfunded 
funds from the analysis sample. Brokerage option investments are also excluded as we cannot 
observe their returns (only 2 percent of plans offer these). All returns on mutual funds are 
computed after expenses and returns on eight benchmark indexes are before expenses, but since 
Vanguard’s expenses on mutual funds are low, we avoid subtracting expenses from the indexes 
to avoid estimation error. 





                                                                                                                                                             
15 Money market funds, investment contract funds, unfunded funds and brokerage option funds 
are excluded, as we consider only the performance of risky funds (equity funds, bond funds, 
balanced funds, and company stock). The same applies to the idiosyncratic risk share measure 
discussed next.  
16 Vanguard (2007) reports that the median personalized annual return for participants in the 
defined contribution plans they manage was 6.2 percent as of 12/07; we compute the monthly 
return based on this number.  
17  This is computed as the difference of the portfolio without the return loss, which would grow 
over 20 years by (1.005+0.001093)
240 versus the lower less efficient return of (1.005)
240. EGB 
(2006) use the same approach to demonstrate 401(k) participant losses. 
18   So (1.005+.04)
240 is 160 percent higher than (1.005)
240.   
19 Here we do not consider money market funds, investment contract funds, unfunded funds, or 
brokerage options, as they are not included in the efficiency test. 
20 We take the ln form of number of participant and total plan assets to scale these variables. 
21 We exclude plans with fewer than two funds to avoid the biased conclusion caused by some 
extreme sample. Similar results obtain if all plans are included. 
 
33